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Abstract
Potential Future Exposure (PFE) for counterparty trading limits is
challenged by new market developments, notably widespread regulatory
Initial Margin, and netting of trade and collateral flows — but PFE al-
ready has many issues, e.g. comparability across counterparties. We
introduce Potential Future Loss (PFL) which combines expected shortfall
(ES) and loss given default (LGD) as a replacement for PFE and provide
extensions to cover the main issues with PFE.
1 Introduction
The utility of Potential Future Exposure (PFE) for counterparty trading limits
is being challenged by new market developments, notably widespread regula-
tory Initial Margin (BCBS, 2015), and netting of trade and collateral flows
(e.g. via SwapAgent®, LCH (2018)). However PFE already has challenges:
counterparty trading limits are not comparable across counterparties because
of varying recovery rates, and because of different loss distributions above the
reference quantile for PFE. In addition, PFE limits are typically changed when
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notation description
CDF−1M (q)(...) inverse Cumulative Distribution Function of (...) for the
quantile q under measure M
V (Π, t, δB , δC) value of the portfolio Π conditional on default
δ∗, ∗ ∈ {B,C} vector with components {termsheet flows, CSA flows,
settlement flows, initial margin} containing the timing on
last cashflow of each type by each counterparty * prior to
default
X incurred CVA; note that this is a constant and has no profile
Y (t) profile of credit protection
Table 1: Notation
a collateral agreement (Collateral Support Annex, or CSA, of the ISDA®1) is
put in place. That is, the effects of the change in loss distribution and any
potential change in recovery are included ad hoc. Furthermore, trading limits
with the same counterparty but at different seniorities are not fungible because
Credit Officers take into account the differing recoveries for different seniorities.
In addition overlaps with credit mitigation and CVA are not included in PFE.
Thus the typical counterparty limit metric, PFE, as a high quantile (95% to
99%) of future exposures, needs updating. We introduce Potential Future Loss
(PFL) which combines expected shortfall (ES) and loss given default (LGD).
With two additional variants Adjusted PFL (aPFL) and Protected Adjusted
PFL (paPFL) these deal with pre-existing challenges and the new ones. PFE is
generally defined as:
Definition 1 (PFEM(t,q)). Potential Future Exposure at time t in the future
for quantile q under measure M is
PFEM(t, q) := CDF−1M (q)
(
max(V (Π, t, δB , δC), 0)
)
where V (.) is the value of the portfolio Π in the netting set of interest, con-
sidering cashflow timing assumptions δB , δC on termsheet and collateral and/or
settlement flows, conditional on default (notation is given in Table 1). The cash-
flow types timing expands on Andersen et al. (2017) to include initial margin
flow timing and settlement flow timings. Thus our definition of PFE includes
the effects of collateral, settlement, and initial margin (cleared or uncleared).
The measure M is often chosen as the inverse-T -Forward measure which
is defined as the risk-neutral value (which is measure-independent) inverse-
discounted by an observed discount curve (which implicitly selects the T -Forward
measure). Inverse-discount means divide by the discount factor. Historical
volatilities may be used in place of market-implied volatilities. Choosing M is
out of scope but discussed elsewhere (Kenyon et al., 2015; Stein, 2015).
1International Swaps and Derivatives Association master agreement.
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Significance Issue with PFE Main Source
Now
Major Lack of comparability across counterparties in
different sectors
Recoveries
Major Lack of comparability between counterparties
with and without collateral
Distribution shapes
Major Lack of consistency with credit mitigation Credit mitigation
ignored
Major Insensitivity to exposure portfo-
lio/distribution effects
Distribution shapes
Medium Insensitivitiy to existing credit losses, i.e.
CVA, that has already gone through PnL
Incurred CVA ig-
nored
Medium Lack of comparability before and after when
collateralization is introduced
Distribution shapes
Medium Lack of comparability within a counterparty
for netting sets of different seniorities
Recoveries
New
Medium Widespread regulatory Initial Margin. Phased
in from 2016-2020
Distribution shapes
Medium Netting of collateral mark-to-market flows and
trade termsheet cash flows, e.g. (LCH, 2018)
which started in 2017.
Distribution shapes
Table 2: Existing and new issues with PFE. Issues are things that significantly
reduce usefullness or accuracy.
2 Challenges to PFE
The effect of widespread regulatory Initial Margin (BCBS, 2015) on PFE was
the initial motivation for our reassessment of PFE, but this reassessment reveals
that PFE has existing issues as shown in Table 2. We will now comment briefly
on each of the issues before introducing PFL which addresses all the issues with
PFE in Table 2. It may seem ambitious to attempt to solve so many issues
at once but in fact there are only two driving factors (often intertwined) for
the issues with PFE: recovery rates and loss distribution effects. These lead
naturally to our proposal for PFL as expected shortfall times loss given default.
2.1 Lack of comparability across counterparties in differ-
ent sectors
PFE limits for a counterparty in one sector is not comparable with PFE for a
counterparty in a different sector because the expected recovery after default
can be wildly different, Jankowitsch et al. (2014) find 16% to 60% across major
sectors. Even within a sector the PFE limits may not be comparable for different
subsectors, consider recoveries on Savings and Loan (median one percent) vs
Credit and Financing (median 65%). Thus it is difficult to assess how the risk
appetite of the bank is being put into practice. By itself PFE does not indicate
the risk appetite of the bank thus impeding efficient risk management.
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2.2 Lack of comparability between counterparties with
and without collateral
Lack of comparability before and after when collater-
alization is introduced
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Figure 1: Considering one time-point on the exposure profile where there is
a LogNormal probability distribution function (PDF) of exposure LEFT, the
collateralized (Calendar Spread) exposure changes to the PDF at RIGHT (very
close to a Student-t with 2 degrees of freedom). Setup details: Geometric
Brownian motion, drift 1%, volatility 20%, MPOR 2 weeks (for collateralized).
Collateralization has two effects w.r.t. uncollateralized exposure: change in
loss distribution; and change in recovery rate. PFE cannot capture either of
these effects, and we examine the numerical significance later. This means that
the PFE limits for collateralized counterparties cannot be compared to those
without collateral. Nor can limits before collateralization be compared to limits
after collateralization. This makes effective risk management more difficult.
With collateralization the exposure distribution changes from a strip of Eu-
ropean Call options (uncollateralized) to a strip of Calendar Spread Call options.
Figure 1 illustrates the change. In addition, the effect of the distribution changes
will be portfolio dependent.
When a collateralized counterparty defaults this is typically because it has
debts. Some of these will be via collateralized counterparties. The default
mechanism is often that it cannot raise liquidity to pay collateral calls. In
short, assets (or financialized assets) pledged as collateral are not available to
creditors. Thus, all other things being equal, we can expect lower recoveries
from collateralized counterparties than uncollateralized, all other things being
equal.
2.3 Lack of consistency with credit mitigation
If a desk wishes to trade with a counterparty and the PFE limit is full, it may
buy credit mitigation (e.g. a CDS) and then d with the Credit Officer about how
much capacity this creates for trading. This is inefficient both from a time point
of view and from potential variability between Credit Officers’ applications of
guidelines. There is less credit risk but PFE and PFE limits have no way to
automatically include such credit mitigation. We assume that the PFE system
automatically includes Independent Amounts, detailed collateral terms, etc. Of
course only a CDS that references the actual counterparty automatically reduces
exposure on default.
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2.4 Insensitivity to exposure portfolio/distribution effects
Since PFE(q) is an exposure quantile it is insensitive to any changes of expo-
sure distribution above q. Thus there can be arbitrary changes in exposure —
provided they are 1-in-20 at any time, for q=95%, say. This means that Credit
Officers have to factor in these possibilities by hand when setting PFE limits.
The distribution-insensitivity of PFE is worse than it appears because the
tail of the portfolio-dependence of the exposure distribution. That means that a
change in the trading pattern of a counterparty can change the exposure above q
and this will not show up. This risk-insensitivity of PFE for relatively common
(1-in-20 for 95% PFE) events is undesirable. Suppose now that Credit Officers
change their q from 95% to 99%. This has two effects: firstly Credit Officers
and Relationship manager have to re-calibrate their risk understanding; and
secondly the PFE limits have to be increased for all counterparties. Even if this
is done, there is now an in-sensitivity to 1-in-100 events: and two or three can
be expected each year, per counterparty.
2.5 Insensitivity to existing credit losses, i.e. CVA, that
has already gone through PnL
PFE is insensitive to CVA losses that have already been incurred. Basel III
deducts incurred CVA from exposure at default in capital calculations on the
grounds that this loss has already gone through PnL (BCBS (2012), Section
2d). It is not reasonable that a credit limit should ignore credit losses, nor is
it reasonable that a metric used for credit control should ignore credit losses.
However, this is the case for PFE and PFE limits unless the limits are manually
changed. This is poor credit risk management.
2.6 Lack of comparability within a counterparty for net-
ting sets of different seniorities
If there are multiple netting sets with the same counterparty at different seniori-
ties then this is a challenge to PFE. Typically there will be separate counterparty
trading limits against each netting set. However, the risk is to the counterparty
not the netting sets so this is an issue. In addition it is generally not possi-
ble, nor desired, to move limit capacity from one netting set to another with a
different seniority 1-for-1.
Different recovery rates is the main reason that Credit Officers have different
appetites for PFE for netting sets at different seniorities (e.g. Jankowitsch et al.
(2014) finds median recovery for unsecured at 42% and for subordinated at 5%
). PFE does not take this into account, but the Credit Officers do — hence
limit management inefficiency and lack of comparability even within a single
counterparty and lack of fungibility.
2.7 Widespread regulatory Initial Margin
One regulatory IM definition is as a 10-day, one-sided 99% exposure, calibrated
to a period of stress. Alternatively, a schedule-based method which uses a
lookup table based on notional and maturity can be applied. The schedule-
based method makes no allowance for netting so most large traders will use the
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Figure 2: The IM challenge to PFE. Shifted LogNormal exposure with quantiles,
including the 99% level defined in regulations for Initial Margin (TOP LEFT).
Comparison with 99% quantile given a 10% volatility increase (stress), TOP
RIGHT; and a 20% volatility increase (BOTTOM). Given IM defined as 99% 10-
day one-sided exposure, PFE appears identically zero in all three cases (ignoring
the issue of return of collateral spikes in exposure covered in the next section).
exposure method. Note that the margin period of risk (MPOR) is defined as
nine business days plus the frequency of collateral calling, so daily calls will give
a 10 business day MPOR.
Figure 2 shows the IM challenge to PFE: with IM, PFE(99%) appears iden-
tically zero, ignoring for the moment the issue of exposure spikes from return
of collateral (see next section). This is true even before we consider that IM
is defined as the 99th percentile calibrated including a period of stress. In the
figure, given a 20% stress, the quantile for PFE would have to be defined as
something above 99.86%. Even if this re-definition of PFE was done, using such
a high percentile for non-IM or non-collateralized counterparties would be prob-
lematic because it would be so high. The numbers that Credit Officers would
be required to sanction would be completely outside previous experience.
The problem for PFE with IM is not simply that PFE can be zero, it is that
PFE is zero and we know that it ignores losses above its reference percentile
(e.g. 95%). This is a very uncomfortable situation: are the losses above 95%
small enough to ignore or not?
It may be argued that the collateral eligibility for IM is sufficiently wide to
make the IM worthless. However, regulations are written specifically to avoid
this including mark-to-market, haircuts, quality floors, etc.
Despite collateral and regulatory IM there can still be significant, if brief,
exposure from spikes in exposure profiles due to return of collateral or similar.
This is addressed by another recent market development, covered in the next
section.
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2.8 Netting of mark-to-market flows and trade termsheet
flows
With collateralized counterparties spikes in exposure are observed on coupon
and principle payment dates when collateral and termsheet flows are not net-
ted. These spikes are from failure to return collateral following a termsheet
payment. Andersen et al. (2017) have pointed out that these spikes may mean
that regulatory IM does not reduce exposure by 99%, but perhaps only by 90%
in some cases.
Market services are now appearing that net collateral and termsheet flows.
It is not clear whether they will eliminate spikes in default situations but if they
do the, addition of IM will produce effectively zero exposure below the 99th per-
centile. This renders PFE(95%), PFE(97.5%), and PFE(99%) of questionable
utility for these counterparties.
3 Potential Future Loss
Given the existing and the new challenges to PFE for counterparty trading limits
described above, we now introduce Potential Future Loss (PFL), Adjusted PFL,
and Protected Adjusted PFL to address them.
Definition 2 (PFLM(t, q)). Potential Future Loss at time t in the future for
quantile q under measure M is the future profile of Expected Shortfall(q) times
Loss Given Default, i.e.
PFLM(t, q) :=EM
[
LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)∣∣∣LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC) ≥ b] (1)
b :=CDF−1M (q)
(
max(LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC), 0)
)
(2)
Notation as for PFE in Table 1. The LGD is inside the expectation to take
into account potential correlation between exposure V and LGD. We expect
that with the emphasis in FRTB-CVA (BCBS, 2017) on WWR modelling, that
WWR will be widely implemented in that timescale. WWR includes changes in
exposure with LGD as well as changes in exposure with credit quality (Green,
2016). Exposure and LGD can be linked via correlation of exposure with credit
quality, and correlation between credit quality and LGD (Altman et al., 2005;
Frye, 2013). Our definition of PFL includes these aspects naturally as PFL
includes LGD.
If we were to assume that portfolio value and LGD were independent then
PFLM(t, q) :=EM[LGD(t)]×EM [V (Π, t, δB , δC)|V (Π, t, δB , δC) ≥ b] (3)
b :=CDF−1M (q)
(
max(V (Π, t, δB , δC), 0)
)
(4)
3.1 Adjusted PFL (aPFL)
This extension to PFL deals with the overlap with CVA. Both the limit for PFL
and the profile calculation for PFL are changed.
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Motivation for Adjusted PFL (aPFL): PFL give a profile of future
potential losses and a PFL limit gives a limit on potential future losses. Now
incurred CVA is a loss that has already gone through PnL so it is not reasonable
to ignore this when considering a limit on future losses. Ignoring incurred CVA
is saying that future losses should ignore existing losses as though they had
not happened. Hence we propose aPFL to incorporate incurred CVA as a flat
constant negative shift on the PFL limit and a flat constant negative shift on
the PFL profile.
It may appear that it is optional as to whether to subtract incurred CVA
from PFE limits, when subtracting incurred CVA from losses. That is, it may
appear that this is just a local policy choice. However this is not the case.
Consider a counterparty that is getting progressively worse. If incurred CVA
is only subtracted from the loss, as incurred CVA increases then the trading
capacity will also increase. This is undesireable behaviour. If we subtract from
both the limit and the PFE then we capture both effects.
It may appear that by subtracting incurred CVA from both the PFL limit and
from the PFL profile we have not achieved anything. This is not correct because
the effect on the PFL profile is non-linear: only paths which still have positive
exposure will contribute to the new aPFL profile. In addition monitoring of
PFL limit changes enables Risk to observe losses already taken in PnL by the
Front Office and so foster coherent management of risk across front and middle
office. Pykhtin (2011) discussed the interaction of incurred CVA with limits.
Adjusted Potential Future Loss(q), aPFL(q) is the future profile of PFL(q)
with incurred CVA removed, and where the associated limit has had incurred
CVA removed.
Definition 3 (aPFLM(t, q)). Adjusted Potential Future Loss at time t in the
future for quantile q under measure M is the future profile of Expected Short-
fall(q) times Loss Given Defaul,t adjusted for incurred CVA X, i.e.
aPFLM(t, q) :=EM
[
(LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X)∣∣∣LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X ≥ b] (5)
b :=CDF−1M (q)
(
max(LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X, 0)
)
(6)
An example is in the Numerical Examples Section later.
This definition, and the one below, could be modified by instead subtracting
the time zero expected forward CVA, i.e. without resimulation. This would
avoid applying more and more “expired” CVA later in the profiles.
3.2 Protected Adjusted PFL (paPFL)
This extension to PFL deals with credit mitigation, as well as incurred CVA.
Motivation for Protected Adjusted PFL (paPFL): a CVA desk may
hedge the credit risk of a counterparty. It seems unreasonable not to include this
credit hedge, hence we propose adjusting the PFL profile to include the effect
of the credit mitigation. We do not propose changing the PFL limit because
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credit mitigation does not make the bank willing to lose more. Instead, credit
mitigation reduces losses.
We do not propose including future hedging actions. We propose including
the mitigation of existing positions only. This is standard from a risk point of
view for the following reasons. Although there may be a hedging strategy and
even a hedging policy circumstances change. Giving credit for future actions is
problematic from a Credit Officer point of view: how can a Credit Officer be
sure that the actions will be carried out, and even that the market will permit
them to be carried out? Typically if a credit crisis is bad enough (2008 Financial
Crisis or later Greek Crisis) then the CDS market closes for the worst names,
and the market may jump for others.
Protected Adjusted Potential Future Loss(q), paPFL(q) is the future
profile of PFL(q) with incurred CVA removed and existing credit protection,
Y (t), is included. The associated PFL limit has had incurred CVA removed but
is not affected by existing credit protection.
Definition 4 (paPFLM(t, q)). Protected Adjusted Potential Future Loss at time
t in the future for quantile q under measure M is the future profile of Expected
Shortfall(q) times Loss Given Default, adjusted for incurred CVA X and existing
credit protection, Y (t), that directly references the counterparty, i.e.
paPFLM(t, q) :=EM
[
(LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X − Y (t))∣∣∣LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X − Y (t) ≥ b] (7)
b :=CDF−1M (q)
(
max(LGD(t)× V (Π, t, δB , δC)−X − Y (t), 0)
)
(8)
Credit mitigation from a CDS is flat up to maturity of the CDS with a value
of LGD times CDS notional. We do not recommend using the Regulatory ap-
proach to credit mitigation in counterparty credit risk because this only changes
default probability. This is inconsistent with the concept of potential future loss
which assumes that default has occurred, so changes in default probability are
not relevant. The regulatory approach would change incurred CVA but we see
this as secondary because the focus is on losses assuming default.
3.3 Limit-setting Process
Because PFL is comparable across counterparties and within counterparties by
design the limit setting process can be much more systematic and transpar-
ent. First an extreme loss appetite can be set as the bank’s risk appetite for
derivatives. We call this extreme because it is not an expected loss but a high
percentile. The bank can then apportion this extreme loss appetite to different
sectors and counterparties according to the competitive advantage and busi-
ness opportunities. As opportunities change the appetite can be re-apportioned
transparently: a given amount of PFL limit in one place is comparable to a
given amount of PFL limit in any other place. Executives can view the PFE
limits and their usage at any granularity w.r.t. counterparties and this will
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be meaningful. With PFE this simplicity consistency of risk control is simply
impossible.
3.4 Recovery Rates
There are no liquid instruments providing market implied recovery rates. How-
ever, many industry studies exist on sector-wide recovery rates and their varia-
tion with market stress (Du¨llmann and Gehde-Trapp, 2004; Altman et al., 2005;
Frye, 2013). Seniority-dependent recovery rate observations are also available
(Jankowitsch et al., 2014). Beyond this bank Know Your Customer (KYC), Re-
lationship Mangers, and Credit Officers together with internal (real-world) risk
models, and market data service providers give inputs to internally computed
recovery rates for use in PFL.
4 Numerical Examples
We demonstrate PFE and PFL (with variants) for a vanilla 10 year ATM USD
IRS. The interest rate dynamics use a CIR stochastic volatility Libor Market
Model calibrated to coterminal swaptions and the 5x5 swaption smile as in
(Green and Kenyon, 2017).
4.0.1 Uncollateralized
Figure 3 compares PFL and PFE for the uncollateralized IRS over its lifetime. It
is striking that the PFL is roughly similar to PFE when we recall that the PFL
incorporates a 60% LGD. This indicates that PFE is ignoring a very significant
exposure tail above the 95% quantile, even for such an ordinary product.
The RIGHT plot in Figure 3 gives the ratio (PFL-PFE)/PFE. The change
in this ratio over the lifetime of the IRS indicates the change in the exposure
distribution above the 95% quantile. Not only does a VaR-type measure ignore
this but the change in ratio cannot be captured with a simple multiplier because
the ratio changes so much: from − 0.2 to + 0.6.
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Figure 3: LEFT: PFE (blue) and PFL (red, thicker) for uncollateralized 10
year ATM USD IRS with notional 100M. RIGHT: Comparison of PFL to PFE.
The change in difference over the lifetime of the IRS comes from the change in
exposure distribution over the lifetime of the IRS.
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Figure 4: LEFT: PFL (red, thin) and Adjusted PFL (plum, thicker) for uncol-
lateralized 10 year ATM USD IRS with notional 100M and CDS spread 1500bps.
RIGHT: PFL (red, thin) and Protected Adjusted PFL (orange, thicker) where
there is now bought protection from a 5Y CDS.
The LEFT plot in Figure 4 shows PFL and Adjusted PFL where the coun-
terparty has a CDS spread of 1500bps which is probably the highest commonly
observable before default. The incurred CVA has been subtracted from the
PFL limit and the PFL profile to get aPFL. The non-linear effect of subtracting
incurred CVA is clear as the difference between the limits is greater than the
difference between the PFL and aPFL profiles.
The RIGHT panel in Figure 4 shows PFL and Protected Adjusted PFL in
the case where a 5Y CDS with notional 10M has been purchased. The maximum
expected positive exposure is under 6M (data not shown) so from an expectation
point of view the CDS may remove all exposure up to 5Y. However, the range
of exposures goes much higher than 6M so the effect of 10M of CDS for 5Y
(assuming an LGD of 0.6) is much less than might be hoped. Thus we observe
again how the non-linearity of exposure and the distribution of exposure combine
to produce risk that is highly expensive to remove. A contingent CDS would
remove all the exposure but these are bespoke and their sellers are familiar with
the observations in this section.
4.0.2 Collateralized, with IM, and with Flow Netting
We now consider the 10Y IRS example with collateralization with an MPOR of
10 business days, zero minimum amount, zero threshold, and daily exchanges
in USD cash.
The LEFT plot in Figure 5 shows the PFE and PFL profiles which are again
roughly comparable despite PFL being calculated with an LGD of 0.6. The
RIGHT plot shows the ratio of (PFL-PFE)/PFE and we see that there are highly
significant differences (ratio of 0.5 and above) after 7 years. This is more extreme
than in the uncollateralized case because the collateralization also changes the
distribution above the reference percentile. Thus PFE is ignoring more of a
distribution issue with collateralised counterparties than with uncollateralized
counterparties.
The LEFT plot in Figure 6 shows the effect of Schedule-based IM. The
exposure spikes from return of collateral are well known. When we consider the
RIGHT plot where there is additionally netting between MtM flows and trade
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Figure 5: PFE (blue) and PFL (red, thicker) for collateralized 10 year ATM USD
IRS with notional 100M. RIGHT: Comparison of PFL to PFE. The change in
difference over the lifetime of the IRS comes from the change in exposure dis-
tribution over the lifetime of the IRS and is more extreme because of collater-
alization.
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scales.
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flows we see that even for PFL there are considerable stretches where there
is effectively zero PFL. With PFL this is useful information because we know
that there is no ignored exposure above the chosen percentile. Where PFL is
effectively zero then there is effectively zero credit risk, and we can be certain
of this. There may be liquidity risk but that is not counterparty credit risk.
5 Conclusions
Developing challenges to PFE in terms of widespread IM and netting of collateral
and trade flows mean that PFE will become of questionable value (identically
zero, but ignoring losses above its reference percentile) as a counterparty trading
limit. Outside of widespread IM and netting of collateral and trade flows, pre-
existing challenges to PFE (comparability across counterparties, exposure dis-
tribution shapes, collateralization, multiple seniorities, ignoring existing credit
losses, ignoring credit mitigation) mean that it is already a poor fit for purpose.
We propose using expected shortfall times loss given default to arrive at Poten-
tial Future Loss (PFL). PFL, together with Adjusted and Protected versions
(including incurred CVA, and credit protection respectively) are robust against
both pre-existing challenges and developing challenges to PFE.
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